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Abstract: This study introduces and examines a new-to-strategy form of Wall Street pressure – ‘short interest
pressure’ – the tension felt by management caused by short sales of the firm's stock. Drawing from a sample of
over 5000 competitive actions carried out by competing firms over a 6-year time period, we test whether the
level of short interest pressure experienced by the firm in one time period is predictive of properties of the
firm's competitive action repertoire in the ensuing time period. Our findings suggest that when faced with short
interest pressure firms tend to carry out a higher number of competitive actions in the following time period, as
well as a set of actions that deviate from the industry norm. In addition, post hoc analysis reveals that this effect
is amplified for poorly performing firms. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the
relationship between capital market signals and competitive strategy.

In a 1998 speech, the then-chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur
Levitt, expressed concern over responses to capital market pressure, such as earnings estimates,
felt by managers:

Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings
expectations may be overriding common sense business practices. In the zeal to satisfy
consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be
winning the day over faithful representation. (Levitt, 1998)
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Zeal indeed. Managers are so strongly motivated to meet earnings estimates because they
fear the severe negative reaction in the stock market when estimates are missed. For example, in
early 2005 eBay missed quarterly earnings estimates by only one penny for the first time in 2
years. This sent its stock price tumbling by nearly 20% over the ensuing two-day period that
resulted in a 4 billion dollar loss in market capitalization. Thus, the market imposes a wellunderstood corrective discipline in response to underperformance that managers actively seek to
avoid.

Capital market pressure is a form of attainment discrepancy, defined as the gap between
expected and actual performance as seen by the firm's internal and external stakeholders
(Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). Earnings pressure, for example, occurs when the investment
community's expectation of a given firm's future performance is higher than that of management's
own estimates. As noted by chairman Levitt, this often motivates managers to take quick
corrective action in an effort to narrow the gap in earnings estimates. Indeed, managers who face
earnings pressure oftentimes engage in ‘public earnings guidance’ or ‘creative accounting’ to
narrow the difference between outsiders’ and insiders’ earnings expectations (Cotter, Tuna and
Wysocki, 2006; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). Earnings pressure can also lead managers
to postpone or forgo long-term projects or decrease spending in advertising and R&D in an effort
to shore up short-term earnings (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005).

The question of how capital market pressure influences the firm's competitive strategy is
less understood and has received limited theoretical and empirical attention. In a study that
helped motivate ours, Zhang and Gimeno (2010) found that earnings pressure predicted the firm's
decision to restrict output in the electricity production industry which resulted in higher prices
and a quick boost in the firm's short-term earnings. These authors stress the need for future
research that explores how capital market pressure influences other aspects of competitive
behaviour beyond pricing and capacity actions.
We aim to answer this call by examining how a specific form of capital market pressure,
short interest pressure, predicts competitive behaviour characterized as competitive action
intensity, the range of different types of competitive actions carried out by the firm, and the extent
to which the firm's repertoire of competitive actions deviates from that of competitors. We draw
our core ideas from a stream of research in strategic management known as competitive
dynamics, which conceptualizes competitive actions as visible, market-directed competitive
moves carried out by the firm to improve its relative competitive position (see Grimm, Lee and
Smith, 2006; Chen and Miller 1994; Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001). As such, our paper
contributes to the competitive dynamics literature that has explored important managerial,
organizational, industry and outcome-related drivers of competitive behaviour. We also provide
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new insights to research in finance that links financial market expectations of firm performance,
like earnings estimates, to competitive strategy. In particular, we bring greater clarity to the
question of how capital market pressure corresponds to the firm's competitive actions carried out
over finite periods of time.

Short interest pressure

Our study introduces and examines a new-to-strategy form of capital market pressure,
short interest pressure, which we define as the tension felt by management that results from the
firm's stock being sold ‘short’ in the market. Short selling is an option-like device used by investorspeculators who anticipate a decline in the price of a given firm's stock price. Here, an investor
who sells a stock ‘short’ at the current price does not actually own the stock, but instead borrows
the shares from a brokerage house. If the firm's stock price does indeed drop, the investor covers
the short position by buying back the shares at the lower price and returning them to the initial
lender. The investor's profit is the difference between the higher selling price and lower buy-back
price. However, if the price of the stock increases, the short seller's potential losses are unlimited.
The study of the effects of short selling is unprecedented in strategy research and is of
utmost importance because short interest, measured as the number of shares sold short relative
to total shares outstanding, is a variable that finance scholars have shown to have a profoundly
negative impact on future share prices. Indeed, prior studies that examined the relationship
between short interest and future abnormal returns found that firms with little to no short
interest experienced returns on a par with the broader stock indices (Boehmer, Huszar and
Jordan, 2010), whereas firms having 5% or more of their outstanding shares sold short
experienced, on average, 18% losses in future share price (Dechow et al., 2001). So, as a signal of
future poor performance, it is critical to explore how short interest pressure impacts the firm's
future competitive strategy.

A key difference between short interest pressure and earning pressure, for example, is that
investors are able to short a stock at any time; there are no quarterly estimates to meet. The use of
earnings guidance will do little to alleviate the effects of short interest on the downward pressure
on the firm's future stock. Instead, consistent with Zhang and Gimeno's (2010) findings, we
believe that the level of short interest pressure experienced in a given time period will correlate
with the firm's strategic choices in the ensuing time period. Finance scholars Fuller and Jensen
(2002) agree, stating that ‘the valuation Wall Street puts on a company's securities and the
trajectory of those prices affects the nature of the strategies firms adopt and, hence, their
prospects for success’ (p. 63). Short interest pressure as an indicator of poor future performance
is similar in effect to Altman's bankruptcy predictor (Altman, 1968; Chakravarthy, 1986). Prior
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research found that performance-distressed firms which compete in otherwise favourable
conditions (high industry growth, high barriers to entry) are likely to compete in a highly
aggressive manner in an attempt to restore competitiveness and performance (Ferrier et al.,
2002). Our study explores how short interest pressure predicts the nature of and, in particular,
three properties of the firm's competitive action repertoire that, as will be discussed more fully
below, prior research has firmly established as being predictive of high levels of performance
(Basdeo et al., 2006; Deephouse, 1999; Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1996a;
Young, Smith and Grimm, 1996). In other words, when faced with short interest pressure,
managers take corrective action by carrying out competitive actions captured by specific
attributes of the firm's competitive action repertoire.

Strategy-as-action

Built from the notion within Austrian economics that views competition as a process in
which firms continually strive to outcompete each other (Jacobsen, 1992; Kirzner, 1973; Thomas
and Pollock, 1999), the stream of research widely known as competitive dynamics has garnered
widespread attention not only in the field of strategic management but also in entrepreneurship,
marketing, inter-organizational networks and others (Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009; Ketchen,
Snow and Hoover, 2004; Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001). At its core, competitive dynamics views
a firm's strategy as observed competitive action (Grimm, Lee and Smith, 2006; Smith, Grimm and
Gannon, 1992). Scholars in this area have explored, for example, how individual competitive
actions stimulate competitive responses (Chen and Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith and Grimm, 1992)
and how characteristics of the firm's entire repertoire of competitive actions influence firm
performance (Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). Competitive
dynamics also complements hypercompetition theory in so far as it empirically examines the
aggressiveness with which firms carry out competitive actions as they strive for strategic
supremacy by attempting to erode or neutralize the competitive advantage of rivals (D'Aveni,
1994; Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Young, Smith and Grimm, 1996).

Given the impact of competitive actions on rival firms and relative performance, it is vital to
understand the managerial, organizational and contextual antecedents of competitive action. To
this end, prior research has empirically examined how a variety of organizational- and industrylevel factors serve as drivers of competitive behaviour: firm size (Chen and Hambrick, 1995), top
management team characteristics (Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996), past
performance (Ferrier et al., 2002; Miller and Chen, 1994), the structure of inter-organizational
networks (Chi, Ravichandran and Andrevski, 2010; Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006),
multinational competition (Yu and Cannella, 2007) and nascent versus established product
markets (Rindova, Ferrier and Wiltbank, 2010).
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More recently, research has shifted toward an exploration of the cognitive and perceptual
drivers of competitive action. For instance, Chen, Su and Tsai (2007) explored how ‘competitive
tension’ − defined as the extent to which a firm's managers perceive a certain level of strain in a
competitive situation and feel pressure to take action − is predictive of aggressive competitive
behaviour directed towards rival firms. Similarly, Livengood and Reger (2010) developed the
concept of an ‘identity domain’ − defined as the areas of the competitive market that hold
particular psychological importance to managers − to explain why firms might compete more
aggressively than usual. Marcel, Barr and Duhaime (2011) explored how different managerial
cognitive schemas influence the likelihood and speed with which a firm carries out retaliatory
actions against rivals. Perhaps most germane to our study, Zhang and Gimeno (2010) explored the
effect of upwards ‘earnings pressure’ − a situation that arises when external analysts’ earnings
forecasts are higher than the firm's own earnings expectations − on competitive behaviour. As
noted above, earnings pressure predicted subsequent restrictions in levels of capacity utilization
among electric utility companies. In sum, this stream of research centres on a variety of situational
signals that are predictive of subsequent competitive behaviour. Our study examines the effect of a
particular kind of situational signal – short interest pressure – on three properties of a firm's
competitive action repertoire.

Short interest pressure and competitive behaviour

Scholars in competitive dynamics have developed theory and empirical methods centring
on conceptualization of firm strategy as competitive action, defined broadly as an externally
directed, market-based competitive move carried out with the intent to improve a firm's
competitive position (Grimm, Lee and Smith, 2006; Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001). Early
research in this stream focused attention on the action−reaction dyads level of analysis (e.g. Chen,
Smith and Grimm, 1992), whereby the characteristics of an individual competitive action, for
example, are important predictors of a rival's competitive response. Research has examined the
antecedents and consequences associated with the entire set of competitive actions carried out in
a specific period of time. This is the competitive action repertoire level of analysis (e.g. Ferrier,
Smith and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). In head-to-head rivalry, firms are
engaged in carrying out an endless series of competitive moves and countermoves, e.g. price
cutting, introducing new products, marketing campaigns, capacity expansions etc., with the intent
to keep each other off balance and their own firm profitable (D'Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973; Smith,
Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001). As previous studies have shown, a variety of antecedents predict
competitive behaviour. We extend this research by examining short interest pressure as related to
three fundamental characteristics of a firm's competitive action repertoire: action repertoire
intensity (how many actions the firm carries out), action repertoire complexity (the extent to
which the firm's set of actions consists of a broad range of different types of actions) and action
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repertoire non-conformity (the extent to which the firm's set of actions is different from that of
rivals).

Action repertoire intensity

An important tenet of competitive dynamics and hypercompetition posits that firms that
are able to initiate and sustain competitive attacks consisting of many actions will keep rivals off
balance and on the defensive (D'Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973). This suggests a more-actions-arebetter posture for the firm's competitive strategy. Indeed, prior research found that firms that
were less inertial and carried out more competitive actions than rivals were positively related to
profitability, gains in market share, and overall reputation (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ferrier, 2001;
Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994; Young, Smith and Grimm, 1996).

Like earnings pressure, short interest pressure is a form of attainment discrepancy
between insiders’ and outsiders’ expectations of the firm's future performance (Wiseman and
Bromiley, 1996). Yet, whereas earnings pressure is the result of analysts’ earnings forecasts being
above internal forecasts, short interest pressure is the result of short-selling investors’
expectations of future share prices being lower than perhaps what the broader investment market
expects. So, the firm's financial- and accounting-based fundamentals and current valuation
notwithstanding, we argue that short interest pressure serves as an additional signal of poor
future performance that increases situational competitive tension and the pressure to take
corrective action.

Prior research suggests that poor past performance is associated with higher levels of
competitive aggressiveness manifest in a higher number of competitive actions carried out
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002). Further, aggressive competitive action also helps the firm
establish a positive reputation in the eyes of key external stakeholders (Basdeo et al., 2006). We
predict that the level of short interest pressure experienced by the firm in a given time period, as a
signal of poor future performance, will be related to a high number of competitive actions carried
out in the ensuing time period. Here, a high number of competitive actions serves as a signal to the
investment community that the firm is committed to take corrective action by competing more
aggressively in an effort to improve its performance vis-à-vis rivals and hence its future stock
returns.

H1: Short interest pressure will be positively related to action repertoire intensity.

Action repertoire complexity
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Another key principle of competitive interaction posits that firms should carry out a
sufficiently diverse competitive strategy in an effort to dampen the ability or motivation of
competitors to respond (D'Aveni, 1994; Ferrier, 2001; Miller and Chen, 1996a). In the context of
dynamic competitive manoeuvring, a firm's rivals can easily interpret, predict and respond to a
simple competitive action repertoire (consisting of only a few types of competitive actions)
carried out by the focal firm. Conversely, a complex competitive action repertoire (consisting of a
broad range of different types of competitive actions) may stun and confuse rivals because it is
more difficult to decipher and unravel, thereby slowing the ability of rivals to respond (D'Aveni,
1994). Indeed, prior empirical research has found that competitive strategy consisting of actions
of many different types is positively related to profitability, market share gain, stock returns and
reputation (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Miller and
Chen, 1996a; Ndofor, Sirmon and He, 2011; Rindova, Ferrier and Wiltbank, 2010).

Prior research has found that poor performance experienced by the firm in a given period
of time is associated with a more complex competitive action repertoire in the following time
period (Miller and Chen, 1996a). In other words, firms carry out a broader, more diverse set of
competitive actions in the hope that, by carrying out actions of many different types, future
performance will improve. We expect that high levels of short interest pressure will be related to a
more diverse mix of competitive actions carried out by the firm in the following time period. A
noticeably broad repertoire of actions could signal to the investment community, and short sellers
in particular, that the firm is engaged in a sufficiently aggressive and comprehensive competitive
strategy to improve its competitive position and future performance.
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H2:Short interest pressure will be positively related to action repertoire complexity.

Action repertoire non-conformity

Theory and empirical research in strategic management appear to have led to equivocal
results and explanations about the relationship between strategic non-conformity and
performance. On one hand, firms that carry out a competitive strategy different from that of rivals
outperform firms that adhere to industry norms (D'Aveni, 1994; Desai, 2014; Gimeno and Woo,
1996; Ndofor, Sirmon and He, 2011; Norman, Artz and Martinez, 2007), especially in industries
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). This point of
view is consistent with the Austrian perspective of strategy which argues that competitive
advantage is derived from a unique alertness to new opportunities and doing things differently
from what other firms are doing (Jacobsen, 1992; Jones, 2001; Kirzner, 1973). On the other hand,
prior research found that, owing to a degradation of competitive legitimacy in the eyes of key
stakeholders, strategic non-conformity is negatively associated with performance (Chen and
Hambrick, 1995; Miller and Chen, 1996b). However, Deephouse (1999) found that ‘balanced’
competitive behaviour (expressed as an inverted U-shaped relationship) that was neither too
different nor too similar to that of rivals exhibited the optimal mix of both uniqueness and
legitimacy.

This prior research notwithstanding, we argue that poor past performance and market
signals of poor future performance are important yet underexplored antecedents to strategic
(non)conformity. Indeed, poor performance often motivates firms to take corrective action and
try something different; managers learn to sustain the competitive actions they attribute to good
outcomes and cease actions they believe are ineffective (Lant and Mezias, 1992; Levitt and March,
1988). In particular, we argue that short interest pressure is a form of attainment discrepancy that
serves as a signal that a significant portion of the investment community questions the legitimacy
of the firm's ability to meet investors’ future expected performance. So, whereas strategic
conformity has been shown in prior research to be positively related to the firm's legitimacy in the
eyes of some key stakeholders, short interest pressure is associated with poor future performance
and weakened legitimacy in the eyes of other stakeholders (Deephouse, 1996; Humphreys and
Brown, 2002).
We argue that, through short interest pressure, managers are motivated to try something
different in an effort to re-establish legitimacy. This logic is consistent with the core ideas from
prospect theory, whereby poor performing firms are more likely to engage in risk-seeking, deviant
competitive behaviours in an effort to catch up with rivals and improve poor performance
British Journal of Mangement, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2017): pg. 120-134. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been granted for this version to
appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Wiley.

8

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the link in the
citation at the bottom of the page.

(Fiegenbaum, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Yet, if taken to an extreme, strategic nonconformity may exacerbate, rather than improve, future performance (Deephouse, 1999).

Thus, we predict that, when confronted with short interest pressure, firms will carry out a
set of competitive actions that is increasingly different from that of rivals. In so doing, managers
will seek to signal to the short-selling community that they are willing to break out of the mould
and try something new in order to jump-start competitiveness and improve future performance.

H3: Short interest pressure will be positively related to action repertoire non- conformity.

Figure 1. Effects on past performance of the interaction of short interest pressure and competitive
behaviour.

Data and methods
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We drew a sample of firms that list pharmaceutical preparations as their primary business
(SIC code 2834). The pharmaceutical industry is ideal to study the relationship between firm
actions and stock market reactions because it has clearly identifiable boundaries which ensure
that the competitive moves carried out among industry participants are directed at improving a
company's position in the industry relative to other industry players. Also, the stock market
valuations of many firms in this industry rely heavily on future cash flows, which ensure that firms
widely publicize competitive moves aimed to enhance the future value-generating ability of the
firm. Here, investors are, in part, likely to use judgements about competitive strategy − especially
actions associated with risky new drug projects − as the basis for future value creation. Firms in
this industry also use a wide range of competitive actions associated with improving their
competitive position in existing products relative to rivals.

Our sample includes all publicly traded firms in the COMPUSTAT database that designated
SIC code 2834 (pharmaceutical preparation industry) as their primary business each year
2009−2014. This sampling process yielded a final research sample consisting of a pooled, 6-year
monthly cross-sectional database for the 104 publicly traded firms that compete within the
pharmaceutical industry. The N for our analysis was 7488, or 12 months × 6 years × 104 firms.
The time frame for our study is particularly salient due to short sellers being blamed for the
downfall of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008
(Saporito, 2008). As a result, managers were keen to avoid high levels of short interest in the
following years.

Dependent variables

Using structured content analysis of published news reports and press releases, scholars in
competitive dynamics have developed a systematic procedure to retrieve and code news about a
firm's competitive moves into different action categories (Grimm, Lee and Smith, 2006; Smith,
Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001). Consistent with this approach, we used Factiva as the news source and
conducted a comprehensive search for all published news reports associated with each firm in our
sample over the study time period. This yielded thousands of news reports that served as the basis
for identifying potential competitive actions. We applied a set of keywords associated with six
different types of competitive actions (pricing actions, marketing actions, new product actions,
legal actions, capacity actions and signalling actions) examined in prior multi-industry studies to
establish our initial set of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999).
Then, following the example of prior research, we recalibrated the set of action categories to
reflect some elements of competitive behaviour unique to the pharmaceutical industry.1 More
specifically, we added the following five action types to the initial set of actions: clinical trial
announcements, licensing agreements, product improvements, legal actions and reputationBritish Journal of Mangement, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2017): pg. 120-134. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been granted for this version to
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enhancing actions. An example news headline associated with a clinical trials action, for example,
is Bristol-Myers, liposome begin phase II testing of ABLC drug. An example news headline we
categorized into a reputation-enhancing action is Eli Lilly to donate drugs to battle tuberculosis
crisis in Russia. An example of a pricing action is Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on about
50 of its injectable anesthetics and intravenous products.

This process yielded 5268 actions distributed across the following categories: capacity
actions (26), clinical actions (475), product improvement actions (102), incentive actions (128),
legal actions (419), licensing actions (821), marketing actions (804), signalling actions (426),
pricing actions (95), new product actions (1183) and promotional actions (489). To check the
reliability of our action category coding, academic experts in strategic management independently
coded a representative sample (N = 300) of news headlines into one of the 11 action type
categories. Using Perreault and Leigh (1989) index of reliability, this categorization approach
yielded a reliability index of 0.89, which exceeds the convention of 0.70 (Denzin and Lincoln,
2000).

In contrast to prior research that examined annual competitive action repertoires, our
analysis centres on the characteristics of firm's competitive action repertoire month by month.
Prior research that explored the relationship between characteristics of the firm's action
repertoire and performance used only annual performance measures, like profitability, and
market share. By contrast, our dependent variable − short interest − is reported monthly, and will
probably vary in accordance with investors’ reactions to short-term attributes of competitive
behaviour.2

Action repertoire intensity

The intensity of a firm's competitive action repertoire was calculated as the total number of
competitive actions (irrespective of action type) carried out each month (Chen, Su and Tsai, 2007;
Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999; Young, Smith and Grimm, 1996).
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Action repertoire complexity

To measure the extent to which a firm's competitive action repertoire consists of a broad
range (as compared to a narrow range) of different action types, we used a Herfindahl-type index
that accounts for the weighted diversity among all 11 action types (Ferrier, Smith and Grimm,
1999; Miller and Chen, 1996a). The complexity measure was computed as follows:

where Na/NTL is the proportion of competitive actions in the ath action category carried out in a
given month.

This index takes into account both the number of action categories and the degree of
concentration of actions within each category. For example, a competitive action repertoire
carried out in a given month that consisted mainly of marketing actions is considered a simple
repertoire. By contrast, a firm's competitive repertoire that exhibits a relative representative
balance among all action types is considered a complex repertoire. Simply put, firms with a low
action complexity score favoured just a few action types. Conversely, a firm with a high complexity
score carried a broad range of action types.

Action repertoire non-conformity

To capture the extent to which a firm's competitive action repertoire deviates from the
industry norm, we used a measure consistent with prior research (Deephouse, 1996, 1999;
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). We first calculated the
frequency of each type of action (i.e. pricing, marketing, product and so on) carried out by each
firm in the industry in a given month. We then calculated the Euclidean distance between the focal
firm's competitive action repertoires in a given month relative to the industry average.

where Ia is the industry average of the frequency of competitive actions in the ath category, IT is
the industry total competitive actions, Fa is the frequency of the firm's competitive actions in the
ath category and FT is the firm's total competitive actions.
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High scores indicate that a firm carries out very different competitive action repertoires
from its rivals (non-conformity), whereas low scores indicate that the firms carry out a mix of
competitive actions very similar to other firms in the industry (conformity).

Independent variables

Short interest pressure

Short interest pressure is measured by the proportion of the number of shares sold short to
the total shares outstanding. Short interest is reported on NASDAQ.com. For calculation simplicity,
each month the shorted interest portfolios were created on the last day of the month based on the
current short interest information as reported on the NASDAQ website. We used the lagged values
(t − 1) of short interest pressure in our analysis.

Control variables

We included a range of relevant control variables in our analysis in an attempt to account
for, at least in part, the possibility that both short interest pressure and the properties of the firm's
competitive action repertoire are influenced by one or more omitted factors. Our choice of control
variables was informed by both prior research in competitive dynamics research that explored a
variety of antecedents of competitive behaviour and studies of earnings pressure that has recently
generated significant interest in the strategic management literature (Zhang, 2005; Zhang and
Gimeno, 2010).

Given our emphasis on short interest pressure as a signal of (lagged) poor future
performance, it is essential to distinguish it from poor past performance. Equally important,past
performance was used as control variable in nearly all studies in competitive dynamics that
explored the antecedents of the attributes of the firm's competitive action repertoire.3 Owing to
its composite and comprehensive nature, we used Altman's Z score to measure past performance.
It is a weighted index of accounting and market-based indicators of performance and liquidity (e.g.
earnings before interest and tax/total assets, working capital/total assets, market value of equity
to book value of liabilities) (Altman, 1968). Although it is commonly used as a predictor of
financial distress and bankruptcy, it is also an important measure of strategic performance and
financial capability (Chakravarthy, 1986; Ferrier et al., 2002). Low Z scores signify financial
distress and risk of bankruptcy (poor performance), while high Z scores denote financial strength
(good performance). We used the lagged values (t − 1) of Altman's Z score in our analysis.
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Other control variables commonly used in competitive dynamics research focused on
predicting competitive behaviour include firm size and firm age (Andrevski, Brass and Ferrier,
2013; Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006; Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a; Young, Smith and Grimm,
1996). We used the log of the firm's total assets to measure firm size, and the number of years
elapsed since firm founding as our measure of firm age.
Zhang and Gimeno's (2010) study of earnings pressure and strategy suggested that
financial constraints could impact the ability to carry out competitive actions. Thus, we controlled
for the firm's budgetary allocations across key functional domains. These were measured as R&D
intensity, capital intensity and advertising intensity. In particular, R&D intensity was measured as
the firm's R&D spending to total sales, capital intensity as the firm's net fixed assets to total book
assets, and advertising intensity as the firm's advertising spending to total sales.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argued that introducing option contracts on a stock could
impact the level of short selling because option strategies allow traders to mimic short-selling
strategies. To control for options arbitrage, we constructed a dummy variable to indicate whether
the stock has traded options.

Because of the volatility of the market and the probability that market indices impact short
selling, we included year dummies in our analysis.

Analysis

The sample means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables are reported in
Table 1. Over time and across firms, our data reveal significant between- and within-firm variation
in short interest pressure and the three attributes of the competitive action repertoires. To
account for this, as well as any unobserved factors that influence our variables of interest, we ran a
fixed-effects regression analysis that accounts for both firm and month fixed effects. Although our
arguments and hypotheses do not imply direct causality, we nonetheless include the lagged values
of short interest pressure (along with past performance) in our analyses to account for the
possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Control
1.

*p<

Mean

0.05;

**p

Standard

deviation

< 0.01.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11
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Control

Mean

Standard

deviation

1.
0.45
Optioned
stock

0.50

3. Firm
age

15.72

2. Firm
size

2.96

32.56

4. Past
5.96
performan
ce
5.
0.23
Organizati
onal slack
6. Capital 0.17
intensity
7. R&D
2.72
intensity
8.
0.09
Advertisin
g intensity
Independent
9. Short
interest
pressure

1

2

3

1.20

0.27
6**

27.92

0.12 0.172** −0.044*
6**
*

0.19
0.13

17.89
0.09

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.01 0.040*
3

−0.019 −0.014

−0.0 0.036** 0.348** −0.127* −0.005
70**
*
−0.0 −0.018 −0.095* −0.027* −0.230* −0.022
39**
*
*
0.02 −0.199* −0.067* −0.125* 0.032*
4
*
*
*

−0.093* −0.031
*
*

0.01

−0.0 0.057** 0.026
08

10. Action 0.10
repertoire
intensity
11. Action 0.06
repertoire
complexit
y

0.86

−0.1 0.028*
30**

−0.002 −0.094* −0.004 −0.074* −0.014 0.076** 0.040*
*
*
*

−0.0 0.014
23*

0.005

12. Action 00.07
repertoire
nonconformit
y

0.22
00.78

11

0.19 0.396**
9**

0.09

Dependent

10

−0.049* −0.010 −0.024 0.083* −0.054*
*
*

0.10 0.166** 0.085** 0.014
4**

0.013

−0.049* 0.008
*

0.047*

0.003

−0.060* 0.031* 0.024*
*

−0.019 −0.007 0.010

0.030* 0.118* 0.046*
*
*

Results

Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher levels of short interest pressure will be positively
related to action repertoire intensity. As reported in Table 2, this hypothesis is supported (b =
0.001; p < 0.01). This suggests that when faced with short interest pressure the firm carries out a
high number of competitive actions in the ensuing time period.
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Table 2. Fixed-effects regression of short interest pressure on action repertoire attributes
2009−2014
1.
2.

Action repertoire intensity Action repertoire complexity Action repertoire non-conformity

p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

*

†Results for year dummies omitted.

Optioned stock
Firm size
Firm age
Past performance
Organizational slack
Capital intensity
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Short interest pressure
−2 log likelihood
Model significance

0.001
0.010***
−0.001*
0.001
0.008
0.040*
0.007*
0.006
0.001**
799.4
p < 0.001

−0.001
−0.001*
−0.001
0.001*
0.001
−0.004**
0.001*
−0.003
0.036
3657.7
p < 0.001

−0.001
0.003*
−0.023
−0.016**
0.004
0.004**
0.001
−0.003
0.010**
3121.4
p < 0.001

Hypothesis 2 predicted that short interest pressure will be positively related to the
complexity of a firm's action repertoire. This hypothesis is not supported. Apparently, short
interest pressure has little effect on the firm's choice to carry out a broad range (or narrow set) of
competitive actions.
Hypothesis 3 is also supported (b = 0.010; p < 0.01). Here, we predicted that higher levels
of short interest are positively related to action repertoire non-conformity. This suggests that,
when faced with a signal of future poor performance, firms are likely to carry out a competitive
action repertoire that is dissimilar from that of rivals.

Discussion and conclusions

Our study's simple aim was to introduce short interest pressure as a particular form of
capital market pressure and explore how it predicts competitive behaviour in ensuing time
periods. Holding past performance constant, we found that higher levels of short interest pressure
were associated with both a higher number of competitive actions being carried out by the focal
firm and a competitive action repertoire that deviated from the industry norm. We reason that
short interest pressure serves as a signal that foreshadows poor future stock returns, thereby
motivating managers to take corrective action. Short interest pressure is similar in effect to other
forms of competitive pressure that ultimately give rise to increased competitive aggressiveness.
Indeed, prior research has found that other forms of ‘pressure’ experienced by managers that
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stem from topics such as identity domain commonality (Livengood and Reger, 2010), highly
salient rivalries (Kilduff, Elfenbein and Staw, 2010), perceived competitive tension (Chen, Su and
Tsai, 2007) and performance distress (Ferrier et al., 2002) are associated with observed
competitive behaviour. However, the source of the signal is unique to a particular portion of the
investment community, namely investors that sell the focal firm's stock short. Thus, our findings
enhance our understanding of what motivates competitive action.

Whereas Zhang and Gimeno's (2010) study examined how capital market pressure
influenced only one type of competitive action − the restriction of output − we found that it
influences two core attributes of the firm's entire repertoire of competitive actions of different
types. This further enriches and broadens our understanding about the role of capital market
signals on managerial choice associated with a more comprehensive range of potential
competitive actions carried out in response to capital market pressure. Future research could
fruitfully explore how various forms of capital market pressure influence other conceptualizations
of competitive action, like action−reaction response time (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Hambrick,
Cho and Chen, 1996), action−response order (Lee et al., 2000) or the unfolding of the firm's
sequence of competitive actions carried out over time (Ferrier, 2001; Rindova, Ferrier and
Wiltbank, 2010).
We also introduce short interest pressure to the strategic management lexicon of salient
constructs and their corresponding measures that are associated with firm performance. Like
earnings pressure or performance distress, short interest pressure serves as an interpretable
financial signal that we believe to be salient to managers and stimulates managerial response.
Using a qualitative approach or a laboratory design, future research could explore how managers
differentially notice and respond to various forms of capital market pressures. This would help
establish the distinctive validity of short interest pressure as a useful variable in future research.
Further, whereas we measured short interest pressure using stock market data, future research
could adopt the approach used by Chen, Su and Tsai (2007) to capture the subjective managerial
interpretations and feelings of pressure associated with various levels of short interest and other
cognitively linked forms of pressure or tension.

We tested the relationship between short interest pressure and competitive action in the
pharmaceutical industry that, in terms of participating firms’ competitive strategies, may
overemphasize competitive actions related to the development and launch of new products.
Although rival pharmaceutical companies carry out other types of competitive actions designed to
steal market share from rivals, like new advertising campaigns, price discounts and new tactics
used by sales representatives, future research could explore how capital market pressure
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influences competitive behaviour in hypercompetitive industries, nascent markets and those that
are less technology driven.

Our study may also yield new insights for managers. As we noted above, a high level short
interest in a firm's outstanding shares exerts downward pressure on its future stock price. To the
extent that they strive to avoid short interest, managers would do well to credibly signal to wouldbe short investors, and the broader investment community, that the firm's competitive strategy is
sufficiently aggressive, novel and surprising, complex, and tuned to meet the competitive
challenges posed by rivals (D'Aveni, 1994).

Post hoc and exploratory analysis

In an effort to tease out a more nuanced relationship between short interest pressure and
competitive action, we engaged in a series of post hoc and exploratory analyses. Our results
suggest a strong relationship between short interest pressure and two attributes of the firm's
competitive action repertoire (intensity and non-conformity) in the recent 2009−2014 period of
time. During this time frame, the NASDAQ index grew sharply from under 1400 to over 4000. So,
our results are representative of the relationship between short interest pressure and competitive
behaviour in a strong upward market environment. To explore whether our findings were robust
with respect to other market environments, we ran our direct-effects model on data drawn from
the 1998−2004 time period. Here, the NASDAQ grew from about 1600 in early 1998, peaked at
about 4700 in year 2000, then declined to a period low of about 1300 in year 2002 before
rebounding to about 2000 at the period's end. As reported in Table 3, we found that the
relationship between lagged short interest pressure and competitive action repertoire nonconformity was significant (b = 0.012; p < 0.05). However, while action repertoire intensity fell
out of statistical significance in the earlier time period, we found a new significant relationship
between short interest pressure and action repertoire complexity (b = 0.34; p < 0.01). Together
with our core findings, these post hoc results generally suggest that short interest pressure
influences competitive behaviour across all market conditions. However, in an oscillating market
environment the level of short interest tends to be related to competitive action breadth and
differences as opposed to the sheer number of actions carried out, thereby suggesting a qualityover-quantity sort of relationship.
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Table 3. Fixed-effects regression of short interest pressure on action repertoire attributes
1998−2004
1.
2.

Action repertoire intensity Action repertoire complexity Action repertoire non-conformity

p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

*

†Results for year dummies omitted.

Optioned stock
Firm size
Firm age
Past performance
Organizational slack
Capital intensity
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Short interest pressure
−2 log likelihood
Model significance

0.001
0.010
−0.002
−0.001
0.006
0.020*
0.002*
0.006
−0.001
723.3
p < 0.001

−0.012*
−0.001
−0.001
0.001
0.001
−0.003*
0.001*
−0.001
0.034**
3712.7
p < 0.001

−0.006
0.003*
−0.053*
−0.029**
0.002
0.003*
0.001
−0.002
0.012*
2915.8
p < 0.001

Acknowledging the non-linear relationships between, for example, action complexity and
performance (Ferrier, 2001) and action non-conformity and performance (Deephouse, 1999), we
also tested for the possibility of a non-linear relationship between short interest pressure and
each of the three competitive action repertoire attributes included in our study. In each model, the
regression coefficient corresponding to the squared term for short interest pressure was not
significant. This supports the idea that the general relationship between short interest pressure
and competitive action is linear.

We also explored whether the relationship between short interest pressure and
competitive action was attenuated by varying levels of past performance. To accomplish this, we
included an interaction term (short interest pressure × past performance) using centred variables
in an alternative set of regression models predicting action repertoire intensity, complexity and
non-conformity.
Although the coefficient for this interaction term reported in Table 4 was not significant in
the action repertoire intensity model, we did find support for the possibility that, for firms that
had experienced high levels of past performance, the effect of short interest pressure on action
repertoire complexity and non-conformity was reduced relative to those with low levels of past
performance. For poor performing firms, the effect of short interest pressure appears to have
amplified observed levels of action repertoire complexity and non-conformity. In other words,
high performing firms appear to discount capital market signals of poor future performance
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relative to those with poorer performance, who carry out competitive action repertoires in
subsequent time periods that are more complex and differ more from the industry norm than
their higher performing brethren. Yet, as noted above, extreme levels of short interest pressure in
concert with poor past performance could motivate higher levels of action repertoire nonconformity which are likely to give rise to a deterioration of future firm performance (Deephouse,
1999).
Table 4. Fixed-effects regression of short interest pressure × performance on action repertoire
attributes
1.
2.
3.

Action repertoire intensity Action repertoire complexity Action repertoire non-conformity
SIP, short interest pressure.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
†Results for year dummies omitted.

Optioned stock
Firm size
Firm age
Past performance
Organizational slack
Capital intensity
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Short interest pressure
SIP × past performance
−2 log likelihood (base)
−2 log likelihood

−0.274***
0.027***
0.001*
−0.001**
−0.011
−0.388***
−0.001
−0.105
0.975
0.073
799.4
687.2

Limitations and future directions

0.010**
0.020**
0.020***
−0.001*
0.020
−0.080***
0.001
−0.156***
−0.352
−0.037**
3657.7
4039.1

−0.002*
0.008*
0.001
−0.001*
0.019
−0.041
−0.001
−0.001
−0.147
−0.061*
3121.4
2201.3

Despite our inclusion of lagged short interest pressure in our models and numerous
controls, our study cannot completely rule out reverse causality, namely that the properties of the
firm's competitive action repertoire − few actions, simple and conforming repertoires − may give
rise to higher levels of short interest pressure in ensuing time periods. So, we urge future research
to extend work on the relationship between competitive behaviour and firm performance to also
include specific aspects of stock market reactions as an indicator of future firm performance.
Similarly, we cannot rule out the potential for overestimation due to endogeneity. We hope that
our inclusion of a composite measure of past performance (Altman's Z), which contains both
accounting and market-based elements among our many control variables, helps to minimize the
potential for endogeneity.
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Our study is agnostic as to the reasons that investors decide to sell a particular firm's stock
short. On one hand, we reason that it is probably the result of the investor's analysis and
conjectures associated with the future value of the firm's past and current competitive behaviour.
On the other hand, however, the level of short interest pressure experienced by the firm could also
be the result of investors’ estimation of whether the stock is overvalued or not. Future research
could tease apart instances − and the resultant effects − of short interest pressure that comes
about for fundamentally different reasons.

Further, it is widely known that the investment community is composed of different types
of investors. For example, some buy and hold for the long term, whereas others seek to cash in on
very short term gains. Each group seeks, analyses and reacts to different market signals and
information. Recent research has explored whether short sellers have long versus short time
horizons. For example, Engelberg, Reed and Ringgenberg (2012) contend that short sellers have
short investment horizons that do not extend beyond two calendar weeks. Yet, other scholars
argue that short sellers have much longer time horizons (Akbas et al., 2015; Desai, Krishnamurthy
and Venkataraman, 2006; Karpoff and Lou, 2010). Owing to our focus on aggregate, firm and time
period specific short interest, our study cannot determine whether short sellers acted upon short
versus longer term information. Future research could explore whether short sellers attend to
information that signals financial or strategic trouble for the firm far in advance of the decision to
short the firm's stock or information that is more temporally proximate to the short sell decision.
In addition, our theory and results rest on the assumption that managers make strategic
and tactical decisions based on a combination of past information about strategy, competitive
rivalry, and performance and conjectures (their own or those signalled by short sellers) about
future performance. That is, the decisions are endogenous to their expected performance
outcomes (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). In conducting our analyses, we have taken strides to
account for the potential for endogeneity. However, an enduring limitation of our study is that
some endogeneity probably persists. There may be omitted or unobserved factors that are
responsible for the relationships between short interest pressure and competitive action that we
reported above. Future research could first validate our findings − perhaps in different research
settings or different levels of analysis (like action−response speed) − and extend the scope of the
line of inquiry related to the effect of capital market pressure.

In sum, we hope that our study stimulates scholarly interest not only among competitive
dynamics scholars who seek to explore new antecedents of competitive behaviour, but also among
scholars who prospect for the meaningful relationships between phenomena along the interstices
of strategic management, behavioural finance and other areas of inquiry.
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1. For example, Gnywali, He and Madhavan (2006) developed categories of actions in the
global steel industry. Likewise, Yu and Cannella (2007) developed categories of actions in
the global auto industry.
2. Indeed, the focus on short-term results by investors is so prevalent that a 2005 survey of
more than 400 financial executives found that 80% of the respondents said they would
decrease discretionary spending on such areas as research and development, advertising,
maintenance and hiring to meet short-term earnings targets (Graham, Harvey and
Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, because both investors and managers are focused on the short term,
our departure from the annual level of analysis is appropriate to our research question.
3. See Andrevski, Brass and Ferrier, 2013; Andrevski et al., 2014; Audia, Locke and Smith,
2000; Chen, Su and Tsai, 2007; Chi, Ravichandran and Andrevski, 2010; Derfus et al., 2008;
Ferrier et al., 2002; Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006; Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a,
1996b; Young, Smith and Grimm, 1996.
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